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In response to increasing environmental problems associated
with the disposal and release of hazardous substances, Congress
enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-
sation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)l in 1980.2 The statute was
enacted "to provide for liability, compensation, cleanup and
emergency response for hazardous substances released into the
environment and the cleanup of inactive hazardous waste sites." 3
CERCLA originally provided a $1.6 billion fund for the cleanup
of hazardous waste sites, but increased the fund to $8.5 billion
in 1986. 4 Despite the allocation of federal funds for the cleanup
of hazardous waste sites, Congress intended those responsible
for the creation of the hazardous waste site be held financially
responsible.5
* Technical editor, JOURNAL OF NATURAL RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENTAL LAW;
J.D., University of Kentucky, Class of 1993; B.A., Virginia Commonwealth University,
1990.
, Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96510, § 101, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
96019675 (1988)) [hereinafter CERCLA].
2 See H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 at 1718 (1980) reprinted
in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119-6120.
1 3550 Stevens Creek Assoc. v. Barclays Bank, 915 F.2d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir.
1991) (quoting Pub. L. No. 96510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980)), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 2014
(1991), 114 L. Ed.2d 101 (1991).
4 CERCLA § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 961 1(a)(1988).
I According to one court: "The essential policy underlying CERCLA is to place
the ultimate responsibility for cleaning up hazardous waste on 'those responsible for
problems caused by the disposal of chemical poison."' United States v. Fleet Factors
Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1553 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Florida Power & Light Co. v.
Allis-Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313, 1316 (llth Cit. 1990)).
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CERCLA provides a wide range of liability provisions so the
cost of cleanup can be shifted from the federal government to
those responsible for the hazardous waste site. Section 107(a) of
the Act, for example, imposes strict liability 6 on the following
groups: (1) present owners and operators of a facility at which
there was a release or threatened release of a hazardous sub-
stance; (2) owners and operators of facilities at the time the
waste was disposed; (3) hazardous wast generators or those who
arranged for the treatment, disposal or transportation of haz-
ardous substances found at the facility; and (4) transporters of
the hazardous substance to a facility. 7
Potentially responsible parties are liable for cleanup costs
incurred at a facility" from which there is a "release, or threat-
ened release" 9 of a hazardous substance. 10 CERCLA allows the
President, through the Environmental Protection Agency, to
respond when a release or threat of release of a hazardous
substance has occurred." CERCLA also enables private parties
to recover the costs of cleanup, "response costs", against re-
sponsible parties.'
A decade after its enactment, courts are still struggling to
interpret CERCLA. 13 This comment examines the Ninth Circuit's
attempt to interpret CERCLA in 3550 Stevens Creek Associates
v. Barclays Bank.'4 Attention will be given to the court's analysis
of the requirements for CERCLA liability, and the holding that
CERCLA does not allow for recovery of costs incurred in re-
moving asbestos from a building. 5
6 See CERCLA § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (32) (1988). This provision stipulates
that the standard of liability shall be the same as the standard under the Clean Water
Act, Pub. L. No. 92500, § 2, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-
1387 (1988)), amended by Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2531 (1990).
7 CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1988).
, See CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (defining "facility"); see infra part II
A (discussing the facility requirement).
9 CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1988).
10 See CERCLA § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (14) (1988) (defining "hazardous sub-
stance").
" CERCLA § 104, 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1).
,2 CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1988).
,1 See United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 578 (D.
Md. 1986); United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1553-1560 (lth Cir.
1990).
" 3550 Stevens Creek Assoc. v. Barclays Bank, 915 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1990).
" Id. at 1357-1365.
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1. 3550 STEVENS CREEK ASSOCIATES V. BARCLAYS BAK:
FACTS AND BACKGROUND
Stevens Creek brought suit under section 107(a) of CERCLA
6
against Barclays Bank to recover the costs of removing asbestos
from a commercial building constructed in 1963 with asbestos
insulation and fire retardants. 17 Barclays Bank acquired title to
the property and eventually sold it to Stevens Creek.' Stevens
Creek remodeled the building and spent more than $100,000 in
removing the asbestos.' 9
Stevens Creek brought suit in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California where Barclays Bank's
motion for judgment on the pleadings was granted. 2 Stevens
Creek appealed and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 2' In its analysis,
the Steven's Creek court examined the elements of liability under
section 107(a)(2)(b) of CERCLA. 22 The court concluded that in
order for a private party to recover response costs, plaintiff must
establish:
a "release" or "threatened release" of a hazardous substance,
and the defendant must be a person who at the time of disposal
of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at
which such hazardous substance was disposed of." 23
The plaintiff must thus prove the existence of: (1) a facility; (2)
a release; (3) response costs; and (4) a responsible party.
II. LIABILITY REQUIREMENTS UNDER CERCLA
A. The Facility Requirement
In order to recover response costs under section 107(a)(2)(B),
a plaintiff must establish that the defendant was a person "who
at the time of the disposal of any hazardous substance owned
16 CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1988).




, Id. at 1365.
I d. at 1357-1365; see CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
Stevens Creek, 915 F.2d at 1359 (quoting CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a)(2),(4) (1988)).
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or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were
disposed of."' 24 A facility is defined as "any site or area where
a hazardous substance has been . . . disposed of . . . or other-
wise come to be located. "23
In determining whether the Stevens Creek building was a
facility, the court had to answer two questions: [11 "[wjas the
asbestos a hazardous substance and [2] if so, was it disposed of
at the site? ' ' 26 The court in Stevens Creek concluded asbestos
was a hazardous substance without serious deliberation, relying
on the Clean Water Act's designation of asbestos as a "toxic
pollutant"2 and the Clean Air Act's designation of asbestos as
a "hazardous air pollutant. ' 28 Support was also given to the
district court's finding that asbestos is a hazardous substance,
but the court concluded this fact alone was not enough to
determine that the asbestos had been disposed of at the site.
29
CERCLA defines disposal by reference to the Solid Waste
Disposal Act,30 which defines disposal as "the discharge, deposit,
injection, dumping, spilling, leaking or placing of any solid waste
or hazardous waste into or on any land or water so that such
solid waste or hazardous waste or any constituent thereof may
enter the environment or be emitted into the air . . .", Haz-
ardous waste is defined as a solid waste which may cause an
increase in mortality or illness and which may pose a substantial
threat to human health if improperly disposed of or treated. 2
Solid waste is defined as any garbage or refuse from a waste
treatment plant or other discarded material in solid, semisolid
gaseous or liquid form.33
The court in Stevens Creek concluded the disposal require-
ment pertains to hazardous waste or solid waste and not to
- CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1988).
21 CERCLA § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9)(B) (1988).
Kimberly Marsh, Environmental Quality: Hazardous Waste, 21 ENVTL. L. 1141,
1152 (1991).
Stevens Creek 915 F.2d 1355, 1360 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Clean Water Act §
307, 33 U.S.C. § 1317 (1988), amended by Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2531 (1990).
Stevens Creek, 915 F.2d at 1360 (quoting Clean Air Act § 112, 42 U.S.C. 7412
(1988)).
s9 Id.
m CERCLA § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(29) (1988) ("The terms 'disposal,' 'hazardous
waste' and 'treatment' shall have the meaning provided in section 1004 of the Solid
Waste Disposal Act [42 U.S.C. § 69031").
3- CERCLA § 103, 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (1988).
2 Id. at § 6903(5).
" Id. at § 6903(27).
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building materials that do not fit under either category.34 For
the court, hazardous waste was a subset of solid waste defined
as discarded materials, not materials used in the construction of
a building. 3- Here there was no allegation that Barclays Bank or
its predecessors had discarded asbestos. Rather the material was
simply used in the construction of a building, which does not
amount to a discharge, leakage or spillage of hazardous waste
into the environment as required by the definition of disposal.
3 6
The plaintiff in Stevens Creek argued the specific reference
to disposal of a hazardous substance in CERCLA overrides the
definition of disposal in the Solid Waste Disposal Act which
refers to a disposal in terms of a hazardous waste." Stevens
Creek was attempting to persuade the court that the placing of
asbestos in the structure of a building constituted a disposal of
a hazardous substance and this should be sufficient to impose
liability under CERCLA.
The court rejected plaintiff's argument citing two reasons.
First, if Congress intended the disposal requirement to include
hazardous substances and not be limited to hazardous wastes,
Congress could have specifically provided so in CERCLA. 8
Congress could have defined disposal under CERCLA any way
it deemed appropriate, but instead chose to rely on the definition
provided in the Solid Waste Disposal Act.39 The definition in
the Solid Waste Disposal Act specifically refers to disposal in
terms of hazardous waste. 40 Second, hazardous waste and haz-
ardous substance have often been used interchangeably. 41 This
rationale provided further support for the court's conclusion
that the disposal requirement refers to hazardous wastes and not
hazardous substances. 42 Since hazardous substance was often
used in the place of hazardous waste, asbestos in the nonwaste
form, such as in the structure of a building, was not intended
to be covered. 43 A Superfund Study Group's report supported
Stevens Creek, 915 F.2d at 1361.
35 Id.
SId.
Id. at 1362 (emphasis added).
Id.
39 Id.
- CERCLA § 103, 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3).
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this reasoning when it concluded: "both the terms hazardous
substance and hazardous wastes are used, and their use is often
interchangeable, because in the context of CERCLA, hazardous
substances are generally dealt with at the point when they are
about to, or have become, wastes.""
The Stevens Creek court's interpretation of disposal does
find support in other federal opinions. For example, in Pruden-
tial Insurance Co. of America v. National Gypsum Co. plaintiffs
brought suit under CERCLA for compensatory damages against
designers, manufacturers and suppliers of asbestos-laden mate-
rials used in the construction of certain structures.4 5 The court
in Prudential concluded that since there was "no affirmative act
to get rid of the asbestos beyond the sale of it as part of a
complete, useful product, for use in a building structure, the
plaintiffs' allegations fail to reveal that there has been an ar-
rangement for the disposal of hazardous substances .. ."s Fur-
ther support is found in Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan
Materials Co.47 in which an owner and operator of a wood
treatment facility brought an action against chemical suppliers
seeking contribution for the cost of removing contaminants from
a holding pond.4 The court concluded the chemical suppliers
were not liable under CERCLA because the sale of hazardous
substances for use in wood treatment by plaintiff did not con-
stitute a disposal under CERCLA.
49
B. The Response Cost Requirement
Stevens Creek contended at trial that CERCLA must be
broadly construed to accomplish its goals. 50 The court noted,
SUPERFUND SECTION STUDY GROUP, INJURIES AND DAMAGES FROM HAZARDOUS
WASTE ANALYSIS AND IMPROVEMENT OF LEGAL REMEDIES: A REPORT TO CONGRESS IN
COMPLIANCE wrTH SECTION 301(E) OF [CERCLAI, PART 1, 26 (1982). This report has
been given substantial weight by other federal courts. See Covalt v. Carey Canada, Inc.,
860 F.2d 1434, 1437-38 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting the emphasis in the study was on
remedying adverse consequences of improper disposal, transportation, spills or improp-
erly maintained or closed disposal sites).
45 711 F. Supp. 1244 (D.N.J. 1988).
, Id. at 1254.
41 685 F. Supp. 651 (N.D.IIl. 1988).
" Id. at 653; see also Jersey City Redevelopment Auth. v PPG Indus. 655 F.
Supp. 1257, 1260-61 (D.N.J. 1987); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. 22 Env't
Rep Cas. (BNA) 1230 (S.D.lnd. 1983). But see In re Asbestos Sch. Litig., No. 830268
1191 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12576 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1991).
Id. at 654.
Stevens Creek, 915 F.2d at 1362-63.
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CERCLA was designed to deal with the problem of inactive and
abandoned hazardous waste disposal sites.5 Other courts agree
CERCLA must be interpreted broadly, including United States
v. Mottolo where the court held CERCLA must be construed
broadly in order to give effect to its remedial goals. 2 Recogniz-
ing such case law, the Stevens Creek court refused to adopt a
construction the statute would not permit on its face-that dis-
posal sites include buildings."
CERCLA section 104(a)(3)(B) directly addresses the removal
of hazardous substances that are part of the structure of a
building: "The President shall not provide for a removal or
remedial action under this section in response to a release or
threat of release ...from products which are part of the struc-
ture of, and result in exposure within, residential buildings or
business or community structures. '5 4 The Stevens Creek court
interpreted this section as a specific limitation on governmental
action when the release or threatened release concerns materials
which are part of the building structure.
5
1
The plaintiff contended section 104(a)(3)(B) was only a limit
on governmental action, and thus private parties could still
maintain a cause of action under CERCLA when the hazardous
substance was part of the construction of the building.16 Plain-
tiffs relied on section 104 of the Act which provides that the
President may respond to a release if there is a threat to the
public and no other person with the authority or capacity can
respond in a timely manner. 57 The plaintiff interpreted this to
mean private parties could recover when the substance involved
was part of the building." Plaintiff further suggested the "no
other person" in section 104 would make sense only if private
parties were permitted to respond to these situations even when
the federal government could not.5 9 The court disagreed, refusing
to read CERCLA as providing a private cause of action in
" Id. at 1363. See also 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6125.
605 F. Supp. 898, 902 (D.N.H. 1985); see also Dedham Water Co. v. Cumber-
land Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (lst Cir. 1986); United States v . Conser-
vation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 192 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
Stevens Creek, 915 F.2d at 1363.
' CERCLA § 104, 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(3)(B) (1988).
" Stevens Creek, 915 F.2d at 1363.
56 Id.
Id. See also CERCLA § 104, 42 U.S.C. § 9604(4) (1988).
" Stevens Creek, 915 F.2d at 1363.
59Id.
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removing asbestos from a building.60 The legislative history of
CERCLA precluded such an action, according to the court.
6'
For example, when the Senate discussed the Superfund
Amendment and Reauthorization Act6 2 to CERCLA, what is
now codified as section 104(a)(3)(B) was specifically discussed:
"CERCLA response authorities are extremely broad but there
are nevertheless situations, some of which may be lifethreatening
which are not within the law's scope.''63 Specifically, the amend-
ment clarifies that, situations involving materials contained in
the structure of a building are not subject to the remedial actions
of CERCLA.6 While the court in Stevens Creek acknowledged
the Senate discussion may not be authoritative, the court refused
to infer a private cause of action without the clear intent of
Congressional authorization 5
Other courts have refused to' recognize a private cause of
action, including First United Methodist Church of Hyattsville
v. United States Gypsum.66 In First United, for instance, a
church brought suit against the manufacturer of asbestos-con-
taining plaster. 67 In refusing to allow the plaintiff to recover,
the court reviewed the legislative history of the Act and con-
cluded "in view of this clear expression of Congressional intent,
we will not expand CERCLA to encompass asbestos-removal
actions."8
A second court, in Retirement Community Developers, Inc.
v. Merine, emphasized that response costs are unreasonable un-
less consistent with the National Contingency Plan. ' ' 69 The Na-
tional Contingency Plan provides that certain provisions governing
federal removal actions may also be applied to private parties.70
The Retirement Community court concluded that in order for a
6oIld.
61 /d.
, CERCLA was amended by the Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act
of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat 1615 (codified in sections 10, 26, and
42 U.S.C. (1988)).
" S. REP. No. 11, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1985).
Id. at 17.
Stevens Creek, 915 F.2d at 1365.
, 882 F.2d 862 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied 493 U.S. 1070.
Id. at 864.
Id. at 868. But see Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. U.S. Gypsum, 711 F.
Supp. 1244, 1256 (D.N.J. 1989) (concluding that while section 9604 was a limit on
presidential action, it did not apply to private party's removal actions).
" 713 F. Supp. 153, 155 (D. Md. 1989) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B)).
70 40 C.F.R. § 300.700(c)(5).
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private cause of action to be consistent with the National Con-
tingency Plan, the party must follow the same rules that apply
to governmental removals. 7 Since the government cannot re-
move substances considered part of the building structure with-
out Presidential approval, it follows that private parties must
also have Presidential approval.
7
1
The Ninth Circuit in Stevens Creek provided a final argument
why disposal should be construed broad enough to include ma-
terials part of the building structure. The plaintiffs argued such
a holding would have "substantial and far-reaching legal, finan-
cial and practical consequences." 71 The Stevens Creek Court was
not persuaded. 74 As the court in First United noted: to extend
CERCLA's liability scheme to all past and present owners of
buildings containing asbestos as well as to all persons who man-
ufactured, transported, and installed asbestos products into
buildings, would be to shift billions of dollars of removal cost
liability based on nothing more than an improvident interpreta-
tion of a statute that Congress never intended to apply in this
context.
71
Another court concerned about extending the liability of
CERCLA too far was the district court in Retirement Commu-
nity Developers, Inc. v. Merine. 6 For this court, if CERCLA
was extended to include the removal of asbestos, there would be
such far-reaching effects that, absent the clear intent of Con-
gress, such a result should not be achieved. 71 Such a result could
[clonceivably hold liable for removal or remedial costs all per-
sons who presently own houses or buildings with asbestos in
them, all persons who ever installed asbestos, all persons who
transported or delivered asbestos, and all manufacturers of as-
bestos. "71
C. The Release Requirement
While the disposal requirement controlled in Stevens Creek,
the court nevertheless discussed the release requirement. 79 Release
71 Retirement Community, 713 F. Supp. at 157.
72Id.
11 Stevens Creek 915 F.2d at 1359.
I- Id.
73 882 F.2d 862, 869 (4th Cir. 1989).
"1 713 F. Supp. 153 (D.Md. 1989).
" Id. at 158.
Is Id.
79 Stevens Creek , 915 F.2d at 1365.
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is defined in section 101(22) of CERCLA as "any spilling,
leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, in-
jecting, escaping, leaching, dumping or disposing into the envi-
ronment . "..."-0 Under this section, the term "environment"
includes surface water, ground water, land surface or "ambient
air within the United States."" The Stevens Creek court noted
that, while the issue of whether the escape of asbestos in a
building was a release into the environment was not specifically
addressed in this case, courts addressing the issue had concluded
releases within a building should not be considered a release into
the environment.82 The court emphasized that "lelven when an
action is taken that makes the asbestos friable, the resulting
hazard is within the building." '83
Other courts also conclude releases into a building are not
releases into the environment. For example, in First United
Methodist Church of Hyattsville v. United States Gypsum, the
court held releases inside a building were not releases into the
environment and, thus, the cost of asbestos removal from a
building could not be recovered.Y In Covalt v. Carey Canada,
Inc., moreover, the interior of a workplace was not the environ-
ment for purposes of an asbestos-based claim under CERCLA.Y
The court in Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. National
Gypsum also questioned whether the release of asbestos fibers
into a building constituted a release into the environment in light
of other court decisions concluding that the atmosphere within
a building is not the environment as defined under CERCLA.
86
D. The Responsible Party Requirement
In concluding recovery of response costs for the removal of
asbestos was not possible under CERCLA, the Stevens Creek
court relied on the lack of a disposal and a release.87 Nowhere
did the court specifically address whether the defendant fell
within one of the four classes of responsible parties.8 8 However,
42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (1988).
Id. § 9601(8)(A) and (B).
82 Stevens Creek, 915 F.2d at 1359.
'3 Id. at 1361.
882 F.2d 862, 867 (4th Cir. 1989).
860 F.2d 1434, 1436 (7th Cir. 1988).
711 F. Supp. 1244, 1255 n.3 (D. N.J. 1989).
" Stevens Creek, 915 F.2d at 1359.
See infra Introduction discussing responsible parties.
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based on the court's holding, it is possible to infer that the
defendant was not within one of the four classes of responsible
parties. Each of the classes of possible responsible parties has
either a release or a disposal requirement. 99 Since the court
questioned whether there was a release and concluded that there
was no disposal, the defendant could not be a responsible party.
CONCLUSION
Stevens Creek holds, in no uncertain terms, that building
materials incorporated into the structure of a building are not
"disposed" of as required by CERCLA. If followed by other
courts, probably no situation will allow a plaintiff to recover
the costs of removing asbestos from the structure of a building.
At least one court has found the reasoning of Stevens Creek to
be the majority rule. In Anthony v. Blech,90 the court addressed
whether CERCLA provides a cause of action by a tenant against
the owner of a building for costs incurred in removing asbestos
dust that resulted from fire damage within the building.9' The
court concluded Stevens Creek controlled and the plaintiff could
not recover the costs of removing the asbestos dust. 92 The lack
of a disposal of materials within the building was controlling. 3
The decision in Stevens Creek is also unique because it is
one of the first decisions to specifically emphasize that section
104(a)(3)(B) of CERCLA9 should be deemed a limitation on
private causes of action as well as governmental actions when
the hazardous substance is part of the construction of a building.
If this decision is followed by subsequent courts, plaintiffs will
be severely limited, if not totally unable, to recover the costs of
removing any hazardous substance from a building.
"Id.
" 760 F. Supp. 832, (C.D. Cal. 1991).
91 Id. at 833.
91 Id. at 837.
93 Id.
1 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(3)(B).
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